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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The idea of a conference on European security problems that might  
provide an alternative to the post-war bloc-to-bloc divide of the continent  
dates back to the fifties. For fifteen years, the Soviet Union and its allies  
advanced proposals on this issue, always meeting with Western indifference,  
skepticism, or overt opposition. The Soviet Union aimed, sometimes overtly,  
at setting conditions likely to hamper the Western integration—North Atlan-  
tic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Communities, Multilateral Force (MLF) project, and  
nuclear potential sharing. The Kremlin also looked for a solution of the  
German question that might guarantee either neutralization of all of Germany  
or recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The Western govern-  
ments thought that the Kremlin wanted a multilateral conference to fix a  
European settlement in which Communist bloc’s territorial and political reali-  
ties were confirmed and recognized and to promote such a relaxation of ten-  
sions as to make an American presence in Europe superfluous. Consequently,  
the Western powers always rejected Soviet appeals and devoted to the  
strengthening of the Atlantic bloc. Furthermore, the government of West  
Germany stuck to its “Hallstein doctrine,” according to which the only solu-  
tion to the German question was reunification through free elections and full  
sovereignty of the new German state.1 
A significant relaxation of tensions between East and West occurred since the  
mid-sixties. Between 1963 and 1968 an increasing dialogue between the super-  
powers started to develop. Its genesis was in the Soviet achievement, in 1964–65,  
of the second-strike capability on nuclear weapons, which meant the possibility of  
mutual assured destruction (MAD) in case of war. The imminent strategic parity  
between the superpowers created the balance of terror—deterrence—and  
engendered the political will to pursue limitation to the nuclear armaments race  
and to define rules to manage the nuclear arsenal. In October 1966, during 
                                                        
1   The literature on the dialogue between the blocs throughout the decades is overwhelm-  
 ing. See, for example, Wilfred Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Detente, 1950–1991  
 (Basingstoke, England, 2002).   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a speech in New York, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson invited the Soviet  
Union to resume the détente process by agreeing on military troop reductions on  
both sides in order to create an increasing reconciliation in Europe.2 Two years  
later, on July 1, 1968, the Nonproliferation Treaty was signed and created the  
basis for managing the world nuclear arsenal.  
The process of détente between the two superpowers gave Western European  
governments more room for maneuver in their Eastern policy. Many initiatives  
took place in the late 1960s. French Gaullist policy and West Germany’s Neue  
Ostpolitik are widely known.3 In July 1966, the British tabled at NATO a pro-  
posal for a code of good behavior in East-West relations.4 The Italian govern-  
ment signed relevant economic agreements. The Belgian government pursued  
an intensive Eastern policy, mostly with the Czechs and Poles, in order to  
promote economic and political relations.5 A sort of European détente developed  
in parallel with, and thanks to, the bipolar one. Finally, NATO collectively  
endorsed détente as a major goal: in December 1967, the Harmel Report on the  
future tasks of the Atlantic alliance coupled détente with strong allied solidarity.6 
When new U.S. President Richard Nixon in his inaugural speech called for an  
“era of negotiations,” all circumstances seemed favorable for the European  
Security Conference.  
In fact, the Warsaw Pact Political Committee relaunched the proposal on  
March 17, 1969. The NATO member states examined it on the occasion of  
the Washington meeting for the twentieth anniversary of the Atlantic alliance.  
The Western Europeans asked for a positive—even though cautious—reply to  
the Budapest appeal, while the American position was lukewarm.7 The Atlantic  
Council eventually accepted the idea at the December 5, 1969, meeting in  
Brussels and set some preliminary conditions to the conference: a successful  
conclusion of the Ostpolitik treaties, a satisfying quadripartite agreement on 
                                                        
2   National Records and Archives Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United  
 States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 (Washington, DC, 1967), 1125–30. 
3   See for example: T. F. Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign  
 Policy, 1945–1995 (Ann Arbor, MI, 1999); W. Brandt, Memorie (Milano, 1991); See M. Vaïsse, La Grandeur. Politique étrangère du 
Général de Gaulle, 1958-1969, (Paris, 1998); M.P. Rey, La tentation du rapprochement: France et URSS à l’heure de la détente (1964-1974), (Paris, 
1991). 
4   Proposition britannique d’un “code de bonne conduite pour les relations Est-Ouest”  
 ( July 1966–67), série: Europe 1944–70, sous-série: Grande Bretagne, Dossier no. 223, Archives  
 du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris, France (hereafter AMAE). 
5   Dossier général, série: Europe 1944–70, sous-série: Belgique, Dossier no. 157, AMAE;  
 see also V. Dujardin, Pierre Harmel: Biographie (Bruxelles, 2005). See B. Bagnato, Prove di Ostpolitik. Politica ed economia nella 
strategia italiana verso l’Unione Sovietica 1958-1963, (Firenze, 2003). 
6   Final Harmel Report, “East-West Relations Détente and a European Settlement,” found  
 at http://www.nato.int/archives/harmel/harmel01.htm. 
7   Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, “United States and Allied  
 Approaches to the Current Issues of European Security,” October 31, 1969, NSC Country  
 Files, Box 683, Nixon Persidential Materials, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NPM); see  
 also G. Finocchiaro, La Conferenza per la Sicurezza Europea. Il dibattito internazionale fino al 1972  
 (Padova, 1977). 
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Berlin, and the start of negotiations on force reductions in Europe (MBFR).8 
Once these preconditions fulfilled, the West gave its formal assent to open the  
Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) for preparing the conference.  
From November 22, 1972, to June 8, 1973, the heads of diplomatic delega-  
tions from thirty-five countries—the United States, Canada, all European states  
except Andorra and Albania—informally gathered in Helsinki and debated site,  
phases, agenda, and negotiation procedures of the conference. The first phase of  
the conference occurred in Helsinki, on July 3–7, 1973. The foreign ministers of  
the participating states adopted the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki  
MPT and set the opening date and site of the second phase—the negotiations.  
On September 18, 1973, more than six hundred delegates and experts met in the  
brand new hall of the Palais des Nations in Geneva and opened the substantive  
phase of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  
They were to discuss four main issues—the so-called baskets: principles gov-  
erning relations among the participant states and confidence-building measures;  
cooperation in the fields of economics, science, and technology and envi-  
ronment; cooperation on human contacts and other fields; follow-up to the  
conference.  
Although the CSCE was generally considered the most significant diplomatic  
gathering since WW II, the expectations of the participants varied from skep-  
ticism by the United States to enthusiasm by Romania. In November 1972, few  
delegates could foresee what the negotiations would bring about. According to  
memoirs of several participants, the course of the conference developed together  
with the negotiation itself and the expectations of the participants changed  
frequently throughout the long haul to the Final Act.9 During the first four  
months, the delegations were devoted to general discussions on the various  
proposals in a climate of dialogue and cooperation. The drafting of texts started  
in February 1974 and engendered the real hard bargaining. The rule of consensus  
applied to such a rich and complex agenda contributed in making the CSCE the  
long negotiation we know. The necessity of reaching the unanimity of facade  
engendered ad hoc alliances on different topics, continuous games of bargaining  
and pressure—made up alternately of connivance and arm-twisting—where the  
determinant elements of success were both the ability to resist and the skill in  
tabling package deals and overcoming deadlocked situations. At the same time,  
the intentional search for solutions that might satisfy all participants led to 
                                                        
8   NATO Declaration on European Security, Brussels, December 5, 1969. 
9   L. V. Ferraris, Testimonianze di un negoziato. Helsinki-Ginevra-Helsinki 1972–75 (Padova,  
 1977); M. Maresca, To Helsinki. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973–1975  
 (Durham, N.C., 1985) 
 PAG 4 
 
reconciling even the irreconcilable positions, making the Final Act an ambi-  
guous document in which every government could find, and consequently  
underscore, the more suitable and palatable provisions. The third phase of the  
conference was held in Helsinki, from July 30 to August 1, 1975. The heads of  
state and government of the participating countries met for a solemn ceremony  
to sign the Final Act before the world press. In their statements, it is possible to  
notice all the potentialities and limits of the document, both in its nature and  
contents.  
The CSCE seemed to be, and has long been considered as, the seal on détente,  
or a diplomatic parade celebrating previous substantial agreements between East  
and West. Consequently, it has been long overlooked in the literature on inter-  
national relations.  A few works have been published on national  
approaches to the Helsinki CSCE, providing an insight in governments’ policy  
on the CSCE: rationales, goals, preparation, tactics, and results.10 In recent years, many scholars 
have devoted to the analysis  
of the CSCE, its significance, and its development, from the political, historical,  
or juridical point of view.11 It is becoming  
evident that presumably each country participating in the CSCE assigned the  
conference a specific role in its foreign policy.  
In the case of the United States, the Helsinki CSCE appears to be marginal  
and mostly considered in relation to two general goals: the strengthening of  
NATO solidarity and cohesion, on the one hand, and improvement of the  
relationship with the Soviet Union, on the other. Although attention to the  
Atlantic solidarity was present throughout the preparation and the negotia-  
tions, archival sources show that the White House’s main criterion in tailoring  
the CSCE policy was the relationship with the Kremlin. The CSCE may be  
seen as an instrument of U.S. détente, as well as Strategic Arms Limitation  
Treaties (SALT) or trade and cooperation agreements. It may even be seen,  
and has been, as an occasion of entente between the superpowers. Or, finally,  
and it is the opinion of the author in this article, it may be considered as a case  
of application of the linkage theory that characterized the Nixon-Kissinger  
administration.12
                                                        
10   See, for example, Ferraris, Testimonianze di un negoziato; Maresca, To Helsinki.; R.  
 Spencer, ed., Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Toronto, 1984); A.  
 Carrascosa Coso, Santa Sede Y la conferencia sobre la seguridad y la cooperation in Europa: Helsinki,  
 Ginebra, Helsinki (Vatican City 1991). 
11 See J. Andréani, Le Piège, Helsinki et la chute du communisme, (Paris 2005); C. Meneguzzi Rostagni ed., The Helsinki Process. A Historical 
Reappraisal, (Padova, 2005); O. Bange  and G. Niedhart, eds., Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe, (Oxford 2008); A. Menger, V. 
Mastny and C. Nuenlist, eds., Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75, (London, 2008); A. Romano, 
From Détente in Europe to European Détente, (Bruxelles, 2009). 
12   This article is mostly based upon sources from the following archives: National Records  
 and Archives Administration (NARA) and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project—College  
 Park, Maryland, Gerald Ford Presidential Library—Ann Arbor, MI, Historical Archives of  
 the European Union—Florence, Italy, EU Council Archive—Brussels, Belgium, National  
 Archives—London, UK, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères—Paris, France.  
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t h e n i x o n - k i s s i n g e r c o n c e p t i o n o f  
b i p o l a r r e l a t i o n s : D É T E N T E  
 
U.S. President Nixon took the inheritance of his predecessor on dialogue  
with the Soviet Union and détente and improved it by setting principles  
and methods. Nixon’s point of departure was a reappraisal of the American  
worldwide involvement and responsibilities: he saw in the new international  
situation—Vietnam disaster, crisis of the internal consent, financial problems,  
strategic parity with the USSR—the end of the policy of containment, which  
had been guiding the American action since 1947. A global and multidimen-  
sional engagement was no more bearable. The United States had begun to suffer  
financial consequences from the engagement with the Communist threat every-  
where in the world, while new economic and political powers were emerging on  
the international arena: Japan, Western Europe and its European Community,  
China. It was necessary to regain more room to maneuver and to protect  
national interests, without shifting to a blind and inconceivable isolationism.  
Although various political poles were emerging, the structure of the interna-  
tional society remained military and strategically bipolar. Consequently, Nixon  
thought that U.S. foreign policy should follow two fundamental paths: (1)  
recognition of allies’ bigger political and economic role coupled with a redis-  
tribution of responsibilities and burden sharing, on the one hand and (2) a  
concrete dialogue between the superpowers aimed at maintaining reciprocal  
deterrence and international stability, on the other.13 
Nixon was well aware that the Soviet long-term goal remained the anni-  
hilation of capitalism and the realization of a worldwide Communist society.  
However, he believed that the Soviets might find it interesting and convenient  
to shift from confrontation with the United States and its allies to competition  
and, in some cases, to mutually advantageous cooperation. As a corollary, Nixon  
and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger resumed one of the most  
classical means of diplomacy: the technique of the carrot and the stick. The  
Nixon administration was ready to recognize the Soviet Union as a fundamental  
pillar of the international order and would therefore give it incentives for the  
maintenance of this role. At the same time, the American government would  
envisage some penalties in order to discourage Moscow from unfair play and  
from taking advantage of crises at the expenses of the United States.14 Détente  
for the Nixon administration was not and end in itself. It was the strategy and  
the means, rather than the objective and the goal.15 The goal was to secure stability 
                                                        
13   “President’s US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s. Report to the Congress,” March 14,  
 1974, National Security Adviser—Staff Assistant Peter Rodman: Files, (1970) 1974–77, Box 1,  
 Folder: Foreign Policy—President’s Annual Review, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann  
 Arbor, Michigan (hereafter FPL). 
14   NSC Meeting, “Strategic Issues—East/West Relations 2/19/69,” NSC Institutional  
 “H” Files, Box H-020, NPM. 
15   R. L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to  
 Reagan, (Washington, DC, 1985), 29. 
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of the bipolar order and, fundamentally, to gain the United States new freedom  
of action at lower cost. If détente was the strategy, linkage was the tactic. The  
interrelation of international events, on a global chessboard and on all fields—  
linkage—became the diplomatic tool for applying the incentives and the pen-  
alties that were at the center of the strategy of Nixon and Kissinger.  
It is in this framework that the U.S. approach to the CSCE has to be  
considered. According to the linkage theory, the conference could be a good  
“carrot” to induce the Soviets to be more cooperative on other issues. A  
pan-European security conference legitimizing the status quo in Europe was  
compatible with the fundamental premises of Nixon’s foreign policy: enhance  
Western solidarity, all the more so given the West German government’s Neue  
Ostpolitik, and involving the USSR in the management of the bipolar order.16 
 
 
t h e  u . s .  p o l i c y  o n  c s c e 
  
The Road to Helsinki: 1969–72  
During the first period of the Nixon presidency, two U.S. policies on CSCE  
coexisted: one developed by the Department of State, the other led by the  
National Security Council (NSC), namely by Henry Kissinger.  
From December 1969 to the spring 1972, the Department of State, namely  
the Office of European Affairs, enjoyed a great deal room in handling the CSCE  
issues and related consultations with NATO allies. From the spring 1970, the  
Department of State—though sharing the White House’s perplexities that  
the conference might result in a mere “atmospheric détente”—was interested in  
the possibility of favoring more room to maneuver the Eastern European coun-  
tries in foreign policy and promoting a gradual process of liberalization of their  
regimes. It also thought about using the theme of human rights and freedoms to  
challenge the Soviet hegemony in the area. The Department of State therefore  
introduced the issue of freer movement of peoples, ideas, and information  
in NATO consultations, and tabled proposals on practical measures aimed at  
realizing these goals.17 It is worthy to notice here that the American proposals  
had such a maximalist approach as to meet with the perplexity of the European  
allies, which did not want the CSCE to become a confrontational meeting.18
                                                        
16   On the United States and the Ostpolitik, see, for example, R. M. Nixon, The Memoirs  
 of Richard Nixon (New York, 1978); H. A. Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston, 1979); D. C.  
 Geyer and B. Schaefer, eds., American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972”, in Bulletin Supplement n. 1, German Historical Institute 
(Washington, 2004); G. Bernanrdini, “Le relazioni europee hanno voltato l’angolo.” L’Amministrazione Nixon e il governo Brandt: Europa,  
 Occidente, rapporti con l’Est, 1969–1971 (Firenze, 2005). 
17   Department of State Telegram to US Mission NATO, July 30, 1971, Record Group  
 (hereafter RG) 59, NARA. 
18   Sous-direction d’Europe orientale, le Ministre à M. l’Amb. de France repr. permanent  
 de la France auprès du Conseil de l’Atlantique du Nord, “A/S: Discussion au Conseil atlantique  
 sur le Chapitre de l’o.d.j. de la CSCE consacré à la coopération culturelle et aux contacts entre  
 les hommes.”—Paris, April 10, 1972, série: Europe 1971-juin 1976, sous-série: Organismes  
 Internationaux et Grandes Questions Internationales, Dossier no. 2923, AMAE. 
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The White House, on the contrary, had neither interests in nor enthusiasm  
for the CSCE and was mainly concerned with the necessity of limiting possible  
damages of such an adventure. First, the Conference was not to prejudice  
NATO or to question the presence of the United States on the European  
Continent (i.e., American troops, U.S rights on West Berlin). The Nixon  
administration, as well as Western European governments, feared that the  
conference might induce such a sense of relaxation and unjustified euphoria in  
public opinions as to make it increasingly difficult to pass a military budget. The  
U.S. government was already facing congressional requests of substantial and  
unilateral reduction of American troops in Europe (i.e., Senator Mansfield’s  
resolution). Whatever the achievements of the East-West dialogue, there were  
no doubts that Western security still needed a strong and effective NATO.  
Second, and accordingly, negotiations on fundamental security issues were to be  
kept out of a conference involving some thirty countries, including the neutral  
and nonaligned states. These issues were to be discussed in a separate and  
appropriate forum—the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks—  
and develop in advance of, or in parallel with, the CSCE. The MBFR had been  
proposed in June 1968 by the Atlantic Council in Reykjavik for maintaining the  
existing level of security by minor costs and without destabilizing the continent.  
The MBFR negotiations were fundamental for the Nixon administration  
to handle the internal pressures for unilateral reduction of troops in Europe.  
Consequently, the White House made the MBFR an essential prerequisite to  
the CSCE.19 The priorities of Nixon and Kissinger were never put into question:  
the CSCE was, first and foremost, a bargaining chip in negotiations with the  
Soviet Union to gain concrete solutions of fundamental questions such as the  
Ostpolitik treaties, the agreement on Quadripartite Rights on Berlin, the SALT  
treaty, and the start of MBFR negotiations.20 The U.S. government therefore  
withheld its assent and engaged in slowing the convening of the conference until  
satisfactory results had been secured on these issues.21 
The Nixon administration had little interest in the CSCE issues. With  
regard to the principles governing relations among the participant states, the  
major American interests were to avoid that CSCE provisions affecting Quadripartite 
                                                        
19   Box “Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a European  
 Conference,” December 2, 1971, NSC Institutional “H” Files, Box H-229, NSDM 142 NPM. 
20   “Issues of European Security,” April 16, 1970, NSC Institutional “H” Files, Box H-043,  
 NSSM-83, NPM. 
21   Memorandum of Conversations (Nixon, Rogers, Kissinger, Hillenbrand, Sonnenfeldt,  
 Lord, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Gromyko, Dobrynin, Sukhodrev, Alexandrov-Agentov,  
 Zamyatin), “Economic Relations; Europe,” Moscow, May 22, 1972, National Security Archive,  
 Washington, DC (hereafter NSA),; “Briefing of Council on Results of Kissinger Trip to  
 Moscow,” eptember 15, 1972, NSC HAK Office Files, Box 24—HAK European Trip Sept  
 1972, Folder 5, Tel. from US Mission NATO to WashDC, NPM; “Objet: CSCE”—Londres,  
 September 16, 1972, série: Europe 1971-juin 1976, sous-série: Organismes Internationaux et  




Rights and Responsibilities (QRR) on Berlin, on the one hand, and to support  
West Germany’s demand for a clause on peaceful change of frontiers that was to preserve future 
chances of reunification, on the other. As the Western European governments fully shared  
these goals, the United States left the leadership to its allies, which were more  
involved in the CSCE experience. The same can be said about cooperation on  
economics and other fields, which the Nixon administration was negotiating  
bilaterally with the Soviet Union. In a coalition of fifteen countries, the U.S.  
government decided not to take a leadership position and not to impose posi-  
tions on issues that were considered of minor importance. It can be said that on  
the road to the CSCE the U.S. main goal and concern was the preservation  
of the Atlantic solidarity rather than the negotiation of East-West agreements.  
Consequently, the Americans stood flexible on the CSCE and contributed to  
Western preparation within NATO mainly by not opposing European allies.22 
It is worthy to notice, however, that this attitude also allowed Washington  
to keep the Western European governments from giving premature assent  
to convene the conference without due and full satisfaction of the Western  
prerequisites.  
The White House chose a low profile attitude in order to strike a  
balance between supporting the Western positions and shaping its dialogue  
with the Soviets.23 Given these considerations, it is difficult to see the CSCE  
as a proper element of the U.S. détente with the Soviet Union. Neither Nixon  
nor Kissinger expected any practical results from the CSCE. They thought it  
would provide at least “atmospheric détente” and considered it to be important  
for the Western European allies that, in their view, “look[ed] upon European  
Security negotiations as their equivalent to SALT.”24 The  White House  
continued to be skeptical on the CSCE aims: neither the confirmation of the  
status quo nor the development of a vague cooperation seemed to deserve the  
efforts requested by the meeting. Détente with the Soviet Union should develop  
on more concrete issues and negotiations and, above all, bilaterally. What the  
CSCE provided the Nixon administration with was a good carrot to induce  
Soviet cooperative behavior on major issues. Not only did the Soviet Union  
take the CSCE in great consideration, but Brezhnev himself had also invested  
his own efforts and reputation in the event. Once the United States obtained  
satisfaction on its requests, the CSCE was deprived of its bargaining value and  
became the promised concession to the Soviets, who had major interests in  
pursuing it. 
                                                        
22   Memorandum for the President from Rogers, “United States and Allied Approaches  
 to the Current Issues of European Security,” October 31, 1969, NSC Country Files, Box 683,  
 FolderFolder 1, NPM. 
23   Memorandum for Kissinger from Sonnenfeldt, “MBFR-CSCE,” August 21, 1972,  
 NSC HAK Office Files, Box 67, Folder 5, NPM. 
24   Secretary of State, Memorandum for the President, “United States and Allied  
 Approaches to the Current Issues of European Security,” 31 October 31, 1969, NSC Institu-  
 tional “H” Files, Box: H-026, NPM. 
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1972–74: Superpowers’ Entente? In 1972, the Department of State’s ideas on CSCE, which had never enjoyed much echo at the White House, became incompatible with Nixon’s approach to U.S.‐Soviet relations. 
In a year of presidential elections, the immediate and most important challenge to Nixon was to 
honorably disentangle the country from the Vietnam War. To this aim, the development of good  
relations with China and an improvement in the relationship with the USSR  
were to contribute to easing the way out.25 In February 1972, Nixon astonished  
the world by his official trip to Beijing, which had been secretly prepared by  
Kissinger the previous year. In May, for the first time, an American president  
visited the Soviet Union.  
At the Moscow summit, the dialogue between the superpowers brought the  
highest results: the SALT I treaty, the Soviet assent to convene the MBFR talks,  
trade and cooperation agreements in various fields, and the Declaration on Basic  
Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations. On that occasion, Nixon could no longer  
procrastinate on giving U.S. consent, in principle, to the CSCE.  
The Basic Principles came as a surprise to Western European allies. They  
had not been informed about it, despite the fact that in his first diplomatic trip  
to Western European capitals in February 1969, Nixon had provided assurance  
that negotiations with the Soviets would be based on full consultation with  
NATO allies. In actuality, the Nixon government gave this document minimal  
publicity because it did not consider it of fundamental importance. All state-  
ments by Nixon and Kissinger on this issue clearly suggested that the adminis-  
tration regarded the Basic Principles as a road map for future relations with the  
USSR, not as a cookbook with set recipes.26 Nonetheless, it caused some uneasi-  
ness and concern in Western European governments that noticed two clear signs  
of a possible bipolar entente. First, the United States had endorsed the concept  
of peaceful coexistence, a long-standing Soviet term, without even putting its  
own interpretation on record at the summit meeting. Neither the French-Soviet  
declaration nor the German Ostpolitik treaties had gone so far. Second, and  
more worrying, there was a significant omission of reference to human rights  
issues in American statements on the Soviet regime.27 It is meaningful that  
Nixon himself, speaking to the Soviet population when in Moscow, affirmed:  
“The only sound basis for a peaceful and progressive international order is  
sovereign equality and mutual respect. We believe in the right of each nation to  
chart its own course, to choose its own system, to go its own way, without  
interference from other nations.”28 Furthermore, the joint U.S.-Soviet 
                                                        
25   On the Nixon administration and the Vietnam War, see, for example, K. L. Nelson,  
 The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam (Baltimore, J, 1995);  
 J. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS, 1998). 
26   Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 291–93. 
27   Tel. no. 08697 from AmEmbassy Bonn, “US/Soviet Summit and CSCE Declaration  
 of Principles,” June 19, 1973, NSC Country Files, Box 687, Folder 2 (1 of 3), NPM. 
28   Maresca, To Helsinki, 12. 
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declaration confirmed mutual respect of political systems and called merely  
for improvement in relations and contacts. Finally, the description of the U.S.  
goals at the CSCE did not mention human rights, and the slight reference to  
the widening of human contacts did not fill the gap. This attitude was far from  
the position that the Atlantic Alliance, and the West European countries in  
particular, was preparing for the conference. The contrast clearly showed up  
in the subsequent months.  
After the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, the White House took over the leader-  
ship of the U.S. policy on the CSCE. It gave the policy a direction that seemed  
all the more to aim at depriving the conference of any chances to reach concrete  
results. In a talk with British Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend, Nixon himself explicitly  
affirmed that the U.S. government had never wanted the CSCE and that it had  
been the European countries, including the United Kingdom, that had insisted  
on Western acceptance.29 In subsequent bilateral contacts, the Americans  
informed the British that they were not going to take a leadership role on any  
issues of the conference.30 
The West had set two fundamental goals at the CSCE: the invalidation of the  
Brezhnev doctrine and the promotion of freer movement of people, ideas, and  
information. In his report on U.S. foreign policy in February 1972, President  
Nixon still defined the Soviet threat or use of force in Eastern Europe as being  
incompatible with détente.31 Nonetheless, in summer 1972, the NSC questioned  
whether “in light of our relations with the USSR, we want to appear as the  
leading advocate and champion of the anti-Brezhnev doctrine thrust, or begin to  
retreat from any untenable positions.”32 Also on the freer movement issue, the  
United States toned down the requests. On the road to MPT, Kissinger’s main  
aide for European affairs, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, admitted “through bureaucratic  
inertia we have not really re-examined this since 1969, when it might have been  
tactically justified as a measure to badger the Soviets.”33 Sonnenfeldt openly  
informed the British that the U.S. government regarded the CSCE as an  
element of the overall relationship with the Soviet Union. Owing to the new  
relationship with Moscow, the White House was unwilling to introduce an  
element of attrition such as the freer movement topic. This attitude denoted 
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 10 August 1972,” FCO, August 14, 1972—Secret, Document no. 12 in Documents on British  
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a lack of political wisdom on the part of the American administration, which  
failed to recognize the potentiality of the Third Basket. Furthermore, the U.S.  
approach did not take into due consideration the views of the European allies,  
which thought it very important to extend the contacts across the Iron Curtain.  
The Western European governments became more and more exasperated by the  
American drawback. It seemed to them that the president of the United States  
had yielded to the Soviet firmness to police the traffic between East and West.34 
When MPT started in Helsinki, the U.S. delegation adopted a low profile, if  
not a passive attitude.35 Although both the U.S. delegation and the Department  
of State wished to cooperate actively within the Western front, they supposed  
that the White House could send unfavorable instructions. During the MPT the  
skilful leadership of George Vest, the head of the American delegation, assured  
close compliance with the strategy and decisions of the alliance, despite of—or  
thanks to—missing instructions from Washington. Although at the ministerial  
meeting of the CSCE, in July 1973, the U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers  
underscored the importance of the Third Basket for the American government,  
the European allies doubted that Kissinger would agree on the same line and  
stand firm on humanitarian issues. They were aware that the White House did  
not share the point of view of the Department of State. One month later, in  
August, Rogers resigned, and Kissinger was appointed secretary of state. The  
existing dichotomy between the position of the Department of State and that  
of the White House was eventually overcome. The first consequence was the  
removal of Vest from the CSCE delegation and the appointment of Davis Eugene  
Boster, who lacked any experience in international negotiations. A few months later,  
another turnover brought Albert Sherer, former ambassador to Prague, at the head of  
the U.S. delegation to Geneva. Lacking in instructions from Washington and  
weakened by two changes of leadership, the U.S. delegation to the CSCE  
limited itself to discretely supporting the efforts of the European allies, accord-  
ing to NATO guidelines.36 The Nixon administration had clearly chosen not  
to make the CSCE a reason of attrition with Moscow.  
The views of the U.S. presidency were not unknown to the Western  
European governments. In particular, they expected a dramatic change of U.S. attitude at the CSCE as soon as Kissinger, at the time busy with negotiations on Vietnam, could turn his attention to the pan‐European conference.37 This  
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suspicion was soon to be confirmed. At the beginning of March 1973, in a talk  
with Luxembourg Foreign Minister Gustav Thorn, Kissinger overtly accused  
the European allies of being constantly “unhelpful” on CSCE and MBFR, and  
affirmed that they should let the Soviets have what they wanted: “a short snappy  
conference with little substance.” He added that the question of freer movement  
might have a tactical value but was not likely to bring any practical results.38  
In a meeting with NATO permanent representatives at San Clemente, in June,  
Kissinger clearly stated that MBFR talks were much more important than  
CSCE and that it was not helpful to challenge the Soviets by asking for human  
contacts provisions or whatever else could be unacceptable to Moscow.39 Being  
involved in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—SALT II, Middle East,  
Vietnam, MBFR—the Nixon administration did not want the CSCE, a regional  
conference lacking any intrinsic value, to undermine the entente between the  
superpowers on major international problems.  
From the Helsinki MPT to Nixon’s resignation, not only did the United  
States remain passive on human contacts, but also pressed upon allies to speed  
up the negotiations and let a CSCE conclusive summit occur as soon as pos-  
sible.40 If the head of the Office of European Affairs had diplomatically informed  
the British that the U.S. government was inclined to favor a top-level CSCE  
conclusive summit, Kissinger told the Dutch foreign minister that the summit  
had to be accepted, because “Europe [could] not say no to the Soviets on this  
point.”41 Kissinger’s numerous statements on the indifference of White House  
to the CSCE and on the pointlessness of the human contacts question nourished  
the suspicion of an entente between the superpowers over the Europeans’ heads.  
It is significant that in March 1974 the British, who had long tried to build  
bridges between the United States and the Western European countries, bitterly  
suggested that the Europeans “should not rely upon the Americans to fight too hard  
against a summit however meagre the results of the second stage.”42 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40 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 British Policy Overseas; Maresca, To Helsinki, chap. 10. 
41 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At the NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa, in June 1974, Kissinger denied  
either that the White House wanted to hasten works in Geneva or that it  
favored a top-level final summit. Two weeks later, the joint communiqué issued  
at the end of Nixon’s second visit to Moscow stated that the completion of the  
CSCE would be an outstanding event in the interest of establishing a lasting  
peace and that the two superpowers favored a final phase to be convened as  
soon as possible “at the highest level, which would correspond to the historic  
significance of the Conference for the future of Europe and lend greater  
authority to the importance of the Conference’s decisions.”43 Although Kiss-  
inger tried to reassure the European allies that the U.S. government had not  
changed its views or agreed bilaterally with the Soviets, his subsequent actions  
denied his words. He actually urged the Europeans to conclude the negotia-  
tions soon. He described the Geneva talks as “over-bureaucratic” and said that  
delegations were each engaged in presenting shopping lists, mostly on the  
Third Basket. The Western delegations, he added, should not waste time chat-  
ting, but rather should present a list of their essential, and reasonable, requests,  
the acceptance of which would eventually lead to a top-level final summit.  
Although he declared himself in favor of the promotion of Western values,  
he reminded the allies that the Soviet Union had been there for fifty years  
and would certainly not change because of Western newspapers being sold in  
Moscow.44 In NATO meetings in July, the American delegation further  
explained the U.S. views: the West should reduce its request to some six or  
eight fundamental measures and somehow convey them to the Soviet Union.  
This would let Moscow have a better sense of the concessions required of them  
to achieve the third phase of the conference. Then the West should leave the  
bargaining to delegations in Geneva.45 The United States clearly aimed at closing  
the conference by summer 1974.  
If one considers bilateral conversations, it is evident that in 1974 the two  
superpowers shared substantial common views on the conference. They both  
were annoyed by the slowness of the Geneva negotiations and the irreducible  
attitude of Western European delegations and of minor neutral countries, all  
the more so with regard to Third Basket issues that they considered unreal-  
istic.46 In their bilateral talks with Soviet representatives, the Americans  
entirely charged their European allies with the responsibility for the stalemate  
in the negotiations and repeated that the United States had no interests in  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changing the Soviet system. The U.S. government considered it necessary to  
agree on some humanitarian measures likely to facilitate contacts among the  
European citizens, but it had no problems in accepting the principle of respect  
of national laws and customs that the Soviets vigorously requested.47 Knowing  
that the European allies would never accept such a provision in the preamble  
to the Third Basket, the Americans tried to work out a compromise: the clause  
could be included in the principle on sovereignty, and the preamble to the  
Third Basket would refer to the list of principles guiding relations among  
the participating states. It is noteworthy that Kissinger and Soviet Foreign  
Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed to make the Finnish delegation table the  
proposal in order to avoid as the appearance of a superpowers’ entente over the  
heads of the Europeans.48 
The presidential turnover in the United States, due to the Watergate scandal,  
did not seem to change the U.S. policy on the CSCE. The joint U.S.-Soviet  
communiqué issued at the end of the Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok, in  
November 1974, called for the conclusion of the conference as soon as possible  
and at the highest level.  
If we look at the U.S. attitude towards the CSCE from the point of view  
of the negotiations, and above all from the point of view of the Western  
European governments, it is hard not to share the impression of an existing  
entente between the superpowers over the Europeans’ heads and at the expenses  
of human rights and freedoms issues. However, in this interpretation, it is the  
starting point that is misleading. First, the Western European governments  
considered the CSCE to be a useful tool of their détente policy, whereas the  
United States did not. Secondly, Western European governments looked at  
détente as an opportunity to change the political scenario in Europe. They  
aimed at promoting a gradual loosening of bipolar restraints and at deepening  
the two blocs’ mutual interdependence. To this aim, they proposed to expand  
economic and cultural contacts and exchanges and start a mutually advanta-  
geous cooperation in several fields. In the short and mid term, détente had to  
improve the daily life of European citizens and promote wider human contacts  
and mutual knowledge, whatever the regimes and the military alliances. In the  
long run, this effective dialogue was to overcome Moscow’s mistrust towards  
more open contacts and reforms and therefore help a certain degree of liber-  
alization of Communist regimes. Western European governments’ détente  
was a dynamic and revolutionary process to be set in European relations with  
the purpose to overcome the Cold War confrontation and opposition in the 
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continent and to the primary benefit of the European citizens.49 It could there-  
fore be hardly compatible with the global strategy of the superpowers, whose  
dialogue aimed at avoiding confrontation, but also strengthened their interest  
in the perpetuation of the bipolar order in order to handle major international  
problems and crises.50 
In the first major foreign policy pronouncement of the Ford administration,  
Secretary Kissinger speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on  
September 19, 1974, strongly invited Congress to approve the U.S.-Soviet  
trade accords of 1972 and not to tie such agreements to internal Soviet political  
developments such as human rights abuses. He linked bilateral détente to  
“responsible international behaviour by the Soviet Union,” which he said it  
would be used as “the primary index of our relationship.”51 From Kissinger’s  
point of view “the temptation to combine détente with increasing pressure on  
the Soviet Union . . . would be disastrous. We would not accept it from Moscow;  
Moscow will not accept it from us. We will finally wind up again with the cold  
war and fail to achieve either peace or any human goal.”52 The insistence on  
applying linkage between international agreements and internal Soviet political  
liberalization seriously reduced both Soviet convenience of further developing  
détente and American leverage in détente diplomacy.  
 
From Carrot to Stick: The Last Months of the CSCE  
In 1975, the Ford administration changed its views and attitude, and became  
more helpful to the Western cause at the CSCE. First, Kissinger’s statements  
on the conference were inconsistent with the presidential statements favoring  
a top-level final stage. It was therefore the case for him to align to the official  
position of the president, all the more so given the growing coalition in Con-  
gress and the public opinion against détente. Second, the European allies had  
shown no intention in hastening the negotiations or giving up their requests,  
and the Atlantic solidarity would be better served by a more cooperative Ameri-  
can posture. Last, but most important, a reappraisal of the relationship with  
Moscow induced a change in the U.S. foreign policy and inevitably produced  
its effects on the CSCE. 
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In early 1975, the economic crisis that had hit the industrialized countries  
after the oil shock in 1973 markedly invested the United States: unemployment,  
inflation, a growing balance deficit, and the deepest recession since the thirties.  
In his first speech on the state of the Nation, President Gerald Ford affirmed,  
“The state of the Union is not good.” He therefore declared that the first goal  
of the administration was to recover the American economy and thus postponed  
the building of good international relations. The order of U.S. priorities was  
clear: “A resurgent America would do more to restore the confidence of the  
world in its own future than anything else we can do.”53 As soon as the United  
States questioned their ability to flourish unendingly, another blow hit the  
American self-confidence. In early 1975, the situation in Vietnam collapsed,  
with North-Vietnamese Communist troops flooding into the South. On April  
21, the Communists entered Saigon. President Van Thieu dismissed and the  
American evacuation looked seriously like an immediate escape.   
The United States thus perceived itself in economic, political, and above all  
moral decadence. It was necessary to rethink the American international role  
and the relationship with the Soviet Union in particular. Kissinger, who had  
personally negotiated the American withdrawal from Vietnam, was confronted  
with the caducity of the Paris Agreement. Although he declared himself willing  
to continue the détente policy, he also stated that détente could not be selective,  
it had its own rules and, consequently, the pursuit of gains at the expenses of  
the counterpart would engender due consequences: “We shall never forget who  
supplied the arms which North Vietnam used to make a mockery of its signature  
on the Paris accords.”54 
The White House had also to consider the changed sensibility of the  
country and its representatives. The Watergate scandal had revealed the  
dangerousness and the degeneration of “imperial” presidency and secretive  
elaboration of policies. Congress had consequently showed its determination to  
reassume its constitutional role and to restore the institutional balance. More  
specifically, the attention of Congress and public opinion had progressively  
focused on human rights issues. A clear signal came from the Jackson-Vanik  
amendment to the Trade Act. It conditioned the concession of the most-  
favored nation clause with the Soviet Union to the facilitation of Jewish migra-  
tion from that country. Despite the White House’s attempts to mediate with  
senators, Congress passed the amended Trade Act on January 3, 1975. One 
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week later, the Soviet Union denounced the trade agreement on the basis  
of violation of the noninterference clause of the U.S.-Soviet declaration on  
mutual relations. By linking the respect for human rights to trade issues, Con-  
gress had clearly claimed that U.S. détente policy did not ignore the fundamen-  
tal values and the historical mission of the United States.55 Although Senator  
Jackson’s action was mostly based on machinations relating to his political  
career,56 it combined with the conjunction of perceived interests of liberal  
pro-Jewish and pro-human rights groups, on the one hand, and conservative  
anti-Soviet, anti-détente constituencies, on the other, and played a critical role  
in mining the détente policy of the administration.  
President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had to draw the conse-  
quences out of Congress’s change of attitude and modified the American  
posture on foreign policy and the CSCE. Kissinger’s words are particularly  
meaningful in this sense. He informed the publishers of the main American  
newspapers of his updated view: “We must give up the illusion that foreign  
policy can choose between morality and pragmatism. America cannot be true  
to itself unless it upholds human values and the dignity of the individual  
. . . The American people must never forget that our strength gives force  
to our principles and our principles give purpose to our strength.”57 The presi-  
dent himself determined to face the growing public protest by bringing the  
administration position close to the feelings of the population. He in fact  
declared, “Peace is crucial, but freedom must come first . . . The American  
people are still dedicated to the universal advancement of individual rights and  
human freedom.”58 
Kissinger stated that the final stage of the CSCE did not depend on American  
decision, but rather on the results of the Geneva negotiations, where important  
questions still lay unsolved: the Confidence-building Measures (CBMs), human contacts,  
CSCE follow-up. He added that the best way to hasten the conclusion of the conference 
 was for the Soviets to give serious consideration to the Western proposals on those issues.59 
The tone of U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks changed as well. When the Soviets  
complained about the rigidity of the U.S. delegation to the CSCE, Kissinger 
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overturned the charge against the Soviets.60 The NATO meeting on May 29 and  
30 sanctioned the American redefinition of détente policy and brought it back in  
harmony with the European allies. The U.S. delegation actively helped main-  
taining the unity and firmness of the Western camp that made it possible to  
achieve satisfactory results in the Final Act. President Ford declared the U.S.  
willingness to cooperate on the development of a realistic and effective détente  
that might serve Western interests and values. He added that one of the West’s  
goals was to assure that CSCE promises be turned into practical actions for the  
progress of freedoms and dignity of all European citizens. These principles and  
aims were reaffirmed in Ford’s statement at Helsinki, when signing of the Final  
Act.61 In conclusion, it is not possible to overlook the influence of domestic  
factors on the reappraisal of the U.S. détente policy and, consequently, on the  
U.S. attitude at the CSCE. However, it is also evident that misunderstanding the  
interpretation of détente rules on the part of the superpowers played a substantial  
role. Ford and Kissinger interpreted the Vietnam unification under the Com-  
munist regime as an indirect lack of compliance of the Kremlin to the basic code  
of conduct in U.S.-Soviet relations. Accordingly, they were no more inclined to  
use the CSCE as a good carrot, all the more so given the bad consequences that  
the U.S. attitude had had over the Atlantic cohesion and confidence. The  
realignment of the United States to the Western European governments’ tough  
posture at the CSCE was certainly perceived by the Soviet counterpart as a stick.  
 
c o n c l u s i o n  
In Nixon’s conception, a new and more cooperative relationship between  
the superpowers was the key to stabilizing the international order and to gaining  
the United States more freedom of action in managing the important challenges  
of the seventies: Vietnam, economic problems, military budget cuts, public  
opinion’s fears of a nuclear clash. It was, then, necessary, to recognize the Soviet  
Union as a basic pillar of the international order and to keep alive Moscow’s  
interest in such a role via incentives. On the other hand, the United States would  
punish Soviet actions aimed at profiting from crises in order to advance its  
position vis-à-vis Washington. It was the linkage theory, or the technique of the  
carrot and stick. In order to involve the Soviet Union in this kind of relationship,  
Nixon toned down the ideological aspect in the American policy and chose a  
very pragmatic attitude.  The development of détente opened the way to the acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a pan‐European conference by the Western governments. The NATO Communiqué of December 1969 considered such a conference a feasible option in the East‐West dialogue. 
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The CSCE entered in the complex “Nixongerian” strategy of involving the  
USSR in the management of the bipolar order. It was not a proper element  
of the U.S. détente policy. The Nixon administration had little interest in the  
CSCE. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger expected any practical results from it.  
They thought it would provide at least “atmospheric détente.” Mostly the United  
States decided to accept the CSCE to avoid upsetting Western European allies  
that were more interested in the event. However, the CSCE provided the Nixon  
administration with a good “carrot” to induce the Soviets to be more coopera-  
tive on other issues. In fact, from 1969 to 1972, the White House used the Soviet  
desire of convening the CSCE as a bargaining chip in order to obtain conces-  
sions on such fundamental issues as the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin,  
the first SALT agreement, and the Soviet consent to start negotiations on the  
MBFR.  
Once the United States obtained satisfaction on these requests, the CSCE  
was deprived of its bargaining value and became the promised concession to the  
Soviets, who had major interests in pursuing it. The Nixon-Brezhnev Summit in  
Moscow, in May 1972, and particularly the Declaration on Principles guiding  
the U.S.-Soviet relations endorsing the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence,  
seemed to turn détente between the superpowers into a sort of entente. The good  
relationship with Moscow was crucial for the most important goal of the Nixon  
administration in a year of elections: the honorable American withdrawal from  
Vietnam. The impression of a sort of superpowers’ condominium was confirmed  
by the U.S. attitude at the CSCE a few months later. When the MPT started  
in Helsinki the U.S. delegation adopted a low profile, if not passive attitude.  
In June 1973, in a meeting with the NATO Permanent Representatives at San  
Clemente, Kissinger clearly stated that MBFR talks were much more important  
than the CSCE and that it was not helpful challenging the Soviets by asking for  
human contacts provisions or whatever else could be unacceptable to Moscow.  
From the Helsinki MPT to Nixon’s resignation, the United States remained  
passive on human contacts or even pressed upon allies to speed up the negotia-  
tions and let a CSCE conclusive summit occur as soon as possible. Kissinger’s  
numerous statements on the White House’s indifference to the CSCE and on  
the pointlessness of the human contacts issue contributed to alienating the  
Europeans and feeding their suspicions of a possible entente over their heads.  
“A short snappy Conference with little substance” and a summit final stage for  
Brezhnev’s personal success was the good carrot to buy the Soviet support on  
more substantial international questions (e.g., SALT II, Middle East, MBFR).  
Far from “honeymooning” with the Soviets, the White House was simply  
applying diplomatic means likely to preserve and further develop its strategy  
of dialogue with the USSR. The attempts to link international agreements to  
Soviet political liberalization would seriously reduce both Soviet interests in  
further developing détente and American leverage in détente diplomacy. For the 
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White House, the primary index of the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union  
was the latter’s responsible behavior in international relations.  
In fact, the cooperative relation between the United States and the Soviet  
Union on the CSCE did change sensibly when the latter showed, according to  
American opinions, its aggressive face. When, in the spring of 1975, Vietnam  
was unified under the Communist regime, Kissinger bitterly affirmed, “We shall  
never forget who supplied the arms which North Vietnam used to make a  
mockery of its signature on the Paris accords.” Washington realigned on the  
more intransigent Western Europeans’ positions: the CSCE, and its Third  
Basket on human issues, became the stick to punish Soviet aggressive, or at least  
not sufficiently cooperative, policy in the rest of world (Asia, Africa).   
